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Abstract
This paper studies public good provision in the laboratory using the voluntary contribution
mechanism, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in the United States and Japan. Our
enviroJ?llent differs from the standard voluntary contribution mechanism because in one
treahnent, subjects first decide whether or not to participate in providing this public good. This
participation decision is conveyed to the other subject prior to the subjects/ contribution
decisions. We find that only the American data support the evolutionary stable strategy Nash
equilibrium predictions, and that behavior is significantly different across countries. Japanese
subjects are more likely to act spitefully in the early periods of the experiment, even though our
design changes subject pairings each period so that subjects never interact twice with the same
opponent. Surprisingly, this spiteful behavior eventually leads to more efficient public good
contributions for Japanese subjects than for American subjects.
*This research was partially supported by the Zengin Foundation for the Studies on Economics and Finance, Grant
in Aid for Scientific Research 08453001 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in Japan, the Tokyo Center
for Economic Research, and the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University. We are grateful for the many
helpful suggestions provided by participants at the 1997 Amsterdam Workshop on Experimental Economics and the
Fall 1997 Economic Science Association conference, and Andreas Ortmann, Arthur Schram, Martin Sefton, Shyam
Sunder, and Jun Wako. The usual caveat applies.
Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments:
An International Comparison
1. Introduction
Culture and national character have played a central role in explaining differences in
business management and performance across countries, both in the popular press and in
management research. Theoretical research in economics, however, almost universally fails to
consider cultural differences, although recent laboratory research has identified the potential
role of cultural norms in influencing economic outcomes - particularly in the context of
bargaining (e.g., Buchan, Johnson.and Croson, 1996; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Roth et al.,
1991). This cultural influence often arises through differences infairness norms. For example, if
someone feels that they are being treated unfairly, this may trigger a spiteful response; i.e., "a
malicious desire to harm...another person."l If this desire is triggered by behavior of the other
person towards oneself, this spiteful response should be viewed as reciprocal behavior.
In this paper we examine spiteful behavior and cultural differences by studying public
good provision in the laboratory using the voluntary contribution mechanism, in experiments
conducted in the United States and Japan. Our environment differs from the standard
voluntary contribution mechanism because in one treatment, subjects first decide whether or
not to participate in funding this public good. This participation decision is conveyed to the
other subject prior to the subjects' contribution (or "investment") decisions. This allows
reciprocity-motivated subjects to reward positive participation decisions and to spite negative
participation decisions by their opponent. We find that Japanese subjects are significantly more
likely to spite their opponents for non-participation, even though our design changes subject
pairings each period so that subjects never interact twice with the same opponent.
Surprisingly, this spiteful behavior eventually leads to more efficient outcomes for Japanese
subjects than for American subjects.
1 Random House College Dictionanj. 1979.
Buchan, Johnson and Croson (1996) present a detailed review of the literature on
cultural differences in bargaining and in psychology, highlighting how this research suggests
that culture influences fairness norms. They hypothesize that collectivist, Eastern cultures
promote group interests more than individualist, Western cultures, so that Japanese subjects
prefer earning distributions that are more equal than American subjects prefer. They then
provide laboratory evidence from ultimatum bargaining that supports this hypothesis. In
ultimatum bargaining, a spiteful response is represented by a rejection of an offer that provides
a significantly smaller allocation to the respondent. Their findings are consistent with our
interpretation that "unfair" non-participation decisions are more likely to invoke a spiteful
response by Japanese subjects who chose to participate in funding the public good.2 In a very
different context with simple two-stage extensive form games, Beard et al. (1997) find that
Japanese subjects are more willing to reject unequal payoff allocations than are American
subjects. This leads to more "secure" play in the Japanese treatments; that is, the first decision
maker is less likely to offer a Pareto superior but more asymmetric payoff distribution in the
sessions conducted in Japan.
Although Saijo and Nakamura (1995) and others document substantial spiteful behavior
by Japanese subjects, not all evidence supports the hypothesis that Japanese subjects act more
spitefully than their western counterparts. In their ultimatum game study, Roth et al. (1991)
find that Japanese subjects' rejection rates (controlling for the offer amount) are no higher and
are sometimes lower than American subjects' rejection rates. Moreover, some research in
management has downplayed the importance of cultural differences as an explanation for
differences in performance of Japanese and western manufacturing enterprises, emphasizing
instead, for example, differences in monitoring technology (Aoki, 1988; Aron, 1990). One
possible source of the mixed results in previous economics experiments could be other
2 In recent work, however, Roelofs and Sigler (1998) measured the individualism and collectivism values of
American subjects using a questionnaire and find little difference in public goods contribution for subjects who
scored differently on these measures.
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differences in university subject pools. The present experiment tests this hypothesis by
collecting data at multiple universities within each country. The results indicate that
nationality differences have a greater influence on outcomes than within-country university
subject pool differences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the laboratory
environment and experimental design, and summarizes the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the
results and Section 4 offers our interpretation. Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental Environment, Design and Hypotheses
2.1 Environment
We compare participation and investment of American and Japanese subjects using the
voluntary contribution mechanism. In a control treatment ("Treatment C"), both subjects were
required to participate in the voluntary contribution mechanism. In the primary treatment
("Treatment Pll) the laboratory environment implements a two-stage game. In the first stage,
subjects simultaneously choose w~ether or not they participate in the voluntary contribution
mechanism. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's participation decision, subjects
who selected participation in the first stage choose contributions to the public good.
There are two subjects that may fund each public good, a and b, and subject i (=a,b) has
Wi units of initial endowment of a private good. Each subject who participates in funding the
public good must allocate Wi between her own consumption of the private good (Xi) and her
public good investment (yi). From the total public good investment, each subject receives
Y=Ya+Yb+Wy, where wy is the initial level of the pubic good. That is, the nonexcludable public
good available for consumption by each subject is the sum of the investments of two subjects
and the initial level of the public good. Therefore, each subject's decision problem is
max Ui(Xi, y) subject to Xi+Yi=Wi,
where Ui(Xi, y) is subject i's payoff function. We use an identical Cobb-Douglas type payoff
function to transform contributions and the private good into each subject's payoffs:
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Ui(Xi, y)= xiayl-a, where ae(O, 1). Using a monotonic transformation, we specify the payoff
function as follows:
(1)
{xa I-a}puo(xo y)= i Y +500.
, " 50
Our experiment sets (wa, Wb, wy)=(24, 24, 3), a=0.47, and ,8=4.45. With these parameters, if both
subjects participate in funding the public good the Nash equilibrium investment pair of the
voluntary contribution mechanism is lfJ a,9 b) =(7.69,7.69), and the payoff level is
Uj(Xj,y) =7089, where xj=24-7.69=16.31 and y= Yo +h + wy =18.38. The Pareto efficient level of
the public good is determined uniquely by the Samuelson condition and the feasibility
* *condition. Its symmetric contribution level is (Ya,Yb) =(12.02, 12.02). Therefore, the Pareto
efficient level of the public good is 27.04=12.02+12.02+3. Clearly, the level of the public good
with the voluntary contribution mechanism is less than the Pareto efficient level of the public
good, which is the standard problem of this provision mechanism.
The situation just described represents the case in which subjects must participate in the
voluntary contribution mechanism (as in Treatment C), or have already committed to
participate during stage 1 (for Treatment P). However, Saijo and Yamato (1998) demonstrate
that a wide class of mechanisms for funding public goods exists in which subjects have
incentives not to participate. The voluntary contribution mechanism is one of them. Therefore,
the voluntary contribution mechanism is not voluntanJ from the viewpoint of participation
incentives.
Consider now the two-stage game shown in Figure 1. In the first stage, subjects
simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the voluntary contribution mechanism.
In the second stage, subjects decide how many units of their initial endowment to invest after
learning the other subject's participation decision. Notice that non-participation is different
from zero investment with participation. Once a subject decides to participate in the
mechanism, his opponent must choose her investment number without knowing the other
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subject's investment number. On the other hand, if a subject chooses non-participation, then
his opponent knows that he invests nothing.
In our experiment, subjects choose integer investment numbers. If both subjects decide
to participate in the mechanism, then the Nash equilibrium of that subgame is for each subject
to contribute 8, and each earns 7345. No other Nash equilibria arise due to our use of a discrete
strategy choice set. If one subject participates in the mechanism and the other does not, then
the participant maximizes her payoff at yi=11 and earns 2658. The non-participant clearly
invests nothing and earns 8278. If both choose not to participate in the mechanism, both
subjects receive 706. These payoffs are summarized in the normal form game payoff table
shown in Table 1.
The game in Table 1 is a version of the well-known Hawk-Dove game. Although the
usual representation of the public good provision problem is a Prisoners' Dilemma game, the
proper representation is a Hawk-Dove game once participation in the mechanism is a choice
variable. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: either one of subjects participates in the
mechanism. In the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, each subject i chooses 0.68 as her
participation probability Pi. Among these three equilibria, the mixed strategy equilibrium is the
unique evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) equilibrium.3
2.2 Design and Procedures
We conducted four sessions in Japan and three sessions in the United States. Two of the
seven sessions were control (Treatment C) sessions. As shown in Table 2, we conducted
Treatment P sessions at two different universities in each country.4 Twenty subjects
participated in each session for a total of 140 separate subjects. Each subject was randomly
paired with each other subject one at a time-a so-called "strangers" design. The same game
3 See Maynard Smith (1982). Our use of a "strangers" design-randomly repairing subjects each period-also makes
coordination on an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium extremely difficult.
4 We conducted two Treatment P sessions in Tokyo to test whether a difference in instruction and record sheet
wording-"your opponent" versus "the person you are paired with" -affects behavior. As we document below,
results are substantially unaffected by this difference in phrasing. Saijo et aI. (1998) presents additional analysis of
the Japanese data (only) and provides further evidence that the wording does not systematically influence choices.
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was repeated for 19 periods, 4 for practice and 15 for monetary reward, so as not to pair the
same two subjects more than once. No subject had prior experience in a public good provision
experiment. Sessions in Treatment C required approximately 90 minutes to complete, and
sessions in Treatment P required approximately 2 hours. The mean payoff per subject was
$26.75 ($1=100 Yen for the Japanese sessions). The maximum payoff among the eighty subjects
was $38.75, and the minimum payoff was $12.25.
The twenty subjects in each session were seated at desks in a relatively large room, and
each had a randomly chosen identification number. These identification numbers were not
displayed publicly, so subjects could not determine who had which number. In each period we
made ten pairs out of the twenty subjects. The pairings were determined in advance so as not
to pair the same two subjects more than once. Each subject received an experimental procedure
sheet, a record sheet, payoff tables, 15 investment sheets, and 4 practice investment sheets.
Instructions were given by tape recorder to minimize the interaction between subjects and
experimenters. In Treatment C each subject marked her investment on an investment sheet by
circling an integer between 0 and 24. Experimenters collected these investment sheets and then
redistributed them to the paired subjects. During the redistribution, subjects were asked to fill
out the reasons why they chose these numbers. After this redistribution, subjects calculated
their payoffs from the payoff tables. Then the next round started.
Treatment P had one additional step. Before choosing their investment, subjects
decided whether or not they would participate in the voluntary contribution mechanism.
These decisions were collected by experimenters and then redistributed to the paired subjects.
After this redistribution of the participation decisions, subjects who decided to participate in
the mechanism chose their investment.
It was common knowledge that eyery subject had the same payoff function. We
distributed three kinds of payoff tables to avoid any possible misunderstanding. Table 3 is the
detailed payoff table provided to subjects in real rounds: the rows are for the subject's own
investment numbers and the columns are for the opponent's investment numbers. We also
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presented a rough payoff table summarizing average payoffs for sets of 9 or 12 payoff cells,
shown in Table 3, as well as an iso-payoff map. Most subjects indicated in their post-
experiment questionnaire that they used the detailed payoff table (Table 3). We gave subjects
three minutes to study these three payoff tables before the practice rounds and ten minutes to
study them before the real rounds. The payoff function and tables used for practice and real
rounds were different.
The sessions in Japan were conducted in Japanese, and the sessions in America were
conducted in English. The instructions and forms were translated from Japanese to English by
the two bilingual co-authors. The exchange rate used to translate payoffs from Japan to
America was $1=100 Yen.
Our use of multiple university subject pools in each country is an important aspect of
the design for our objective to study cultural differences. Differences in results for any two
universities could be due to subject pool effects unrelated to culture and nationality. To
establish a significant cultural difference one must show that between-countnJ differences are
greater than within-country differences. We should also highlight the fact that there exist
important similarities between sets of universities across countries. Purdue University and the
University of Tsukuba both have a major emphasis on engineering and science and are both in
(relatively) small"college towns" with predominantly university-resident students. By
contrast, Tokyo Metropolitan University and the University of Southern California are both
situated in major urban centers with many off-campus"commuter" students. Subject pool
differences other than nationality and culture are therefore substantially lower within these sets
of universities, and these other subject pool differences are considerably greater within
countries.
2.3 Hypotheses
Our first task is to determine if behavior differs across the two countries. Therefore, we
first test the following null cultural hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: In Treatment C the mean investment per subject is equal across countries.
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Hypothesis 2: In Treatment P the rate ofparticipation is equal across countries.
Hypothesis 3: In Treatment P the mean investment per subject is equal across countries, (a)
conditional on one subject participating and (b) conditional on both subjects participating.
Hypothesis 4: In Treatment P the overq,ll efficienClJ is equal across countries.
We also test whether within-country differences are more or less significant than between-
country differences across sessions.
The second set of equilibrium hypotheses is based on the theoretical discussion above.
Because we reject Hypotheses 1-4 in favor of significant country effects, we test the following
hypotheses separately for each country.
Hypothesis 5: In Treatment C tIre mean investment per subject is 8 units.
Hypothesis 6: In Treatment P tIre rate ofparticipation is 68 percent, corresponding to the mixed
strategy ESS participation rate.
Hypothesis 7: In Treatment p/ (a) conditional on one subject participating, the mean investment for
the participating subject is 11 units; and, (b) conditional on both subjects participating, tIre mean
investment per subject is 8 units.
Hypothesis 8: Overall investment is greater in Treatment C than in Treatment P.
3. Results
3.1 Across Country Comparison-Treatment C
Result 1: HlJPot/resis 1 is rejected, although the differences across countries are relatively small in
Treatment C.
Support: Figure 2 presents the average investment per subject in Treatment C across all 15
periods for each country. To display dispersion the figure also shows bands plus or minus one
standard error of the mean. The mean investments are significantly different across countries
at the five- percent level using a two-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test in periods 13 and 15
(and at the ten- percent level in periods 9 and 12). We also conducted a test of Hypothesis 1
after pooling data across periods. Because each subject made fifteen investment decisions the
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data are clearly not independent. Therefore, to account for this dependence we employed a
. random effects error specification ViI =ei + Gi" where ei is a subject-specific error term and Cil is
an tid error. This test rejects Hypothesis 1 at the one percent significance level (t=3.30).
Nevertheless, although significantly different statistically, the average investment by American
subjects exceeds that of Japanese subjects by only about 0.5 investment units.
3.2 Across Country Comparison-Treatment ps
Result 2: Hypothesis 2 is rejected in the final third of the sessions.
Support: Panel A of Figure 3 presents the participation rate by period for each of the five
Treatment P sessions. In the first half of the sessions the variation in participation rates across
periods is clearly more significant than any differences across sessions; however, in the final
third of the sessions the American participation rate (shown with dashed lines) is always below
the Japanese participation.rates.
Table 4 pres,ents a formal test of Hypothesis 2 using a random-effects probit model of
the participation decision, with subjects as the random effect. It presents ten pairwise
comparisons for the five sessions. The alternative to Hypothesis 2 that across-country
differences are more significant than within-country differences is supported: five of the six
across-country comparisons shown in the highlighted box in the lower left of the table are
significant (at the ten-percent level), while none of the four within-country comparisons are
significant.
Panel B of Figure 3 presents the same data pooled within the two countries. The pooled
random effects probit model strongly rejects the hypothesis of no country differences (t=3.05).
We also compared participation frequencies across countries by period using Fisher's exact test.
5 Unfortunately, subject 11 in the Treatment P USC session was confused regarding the subject identification
numbers and investment choices. She was the only subject (of the 140) that participated in this experiment who
appeared confused. She thought the identification numbers were the investment choices, so she typically used her
opponent's identification number (rather than her opponent's investment choice) when calculating her payoffs. In
what follows we remove this obviously confused subject from the data prior to analysis, but our qualitative
conclusions are generally robust when statistics are recalculated using this confused subject.
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This nonparametric test rejects the null hypothesis of equal participation rates at the five-
percent significance level in periods 6, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.
Result 3: Hypothesis 3(a) is rejected but Hypothesis 3(b) is not.
Support: Panel A of Figure 4 presents mean investments by the participating subject when
only one subject participates, for each of the five sessions. Substantial variation exists across
periods, partly because these means (by session) are often based on a small sample size-
typically three or four subjects due to the high participation rates illustrated in Figure 3. In
addition to the substantial variability, careful inspection of Figure 4A suggests the visual
impression that investments are often higher in the American sessions (the dashed lines). For
example, mean investments in the two American sessions exceed those in all three Japanese
sessions in 4 periods, and with the exception of the final period a Japanese session always has
the lowest mean investment.
Table 5 formalizes the sessions I comparison with one participating subject using a
random effects model. Four of the six across country investment differences are significant,
while only one of the four within country differences is significant. Panel B of Figure 4 presents
mean investments along with standard error bands when pooling the sessions within a
country. This figure indicates that investments with one participant are lower in the Japanese
sessions, by about two units on average. Pooling across periods and across countries with a
random effects model, Hypothesis 3(a) is strongly rejected (t=4.56). Moreover, a period-by-
period nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects Hypothesis 3(a) at the five- percent
level in periods 3, 8 and 11.
Figure 5 presents mean investments when both subjects participate. These data fail to
reject Hypothesis 3(b), indicating no systematic differences in investments across countries
when both subjects participate. The pairwise session comparisons shown in Table 6 often
support significant within country differences and often fail to detect significant across country
differences. Overall, differences across sessions are small in real terms, and Panel B of Figure 5
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indicates that the pooled country effect on investmentS with both subjects participating is
insignificant (pooled random effects model t=1.89).
3.3 Equilibrium Hypothesis-Treatment C
Result 4: Hypothesis 5 is supported in the American data, but not the Japanese data.
Support: Recall the mean investments by country shown in Figure 2. With the exception
of period 6, mean investment in the Japanese data always falls below the equilibrium
investment of 8, and a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the Nash equilibrium null hypothesis
that investment equals 8 in ten out of fifteen periods (at the 5-percent level). By contrast, mean
investment in the American data exceeds 8 in four periods, and a Wilcoxon test rejects the Nash
equilibrium null hypothesis that investment equals 8 in only two out of fifteen periods (at the 5-
percent level). We also tested this null hypothesis using a random effects model after pooling
investments across rounds. The pooled data reject the Nash equilibrium for the Japanese data
(t=3.28), but not for the American data (t=1.45).6 Nevertheless, equilibrium investments were
common. Over all 300 investment choices in Japan, 142 (47 percent) were equal to the
equilibrium value of 8. A slightly smaller number of investments (133; 44 percent) were equal
to 8 in the American data.
3.4 Equilibrium Hypotheses- Treatment P
Result 5: Hypothesis 6 is supported in the American data, but not the Japanese data.
Support: Panel B of Figure 3 presents the participation rate by period, pooled within
countries. With the exception of period I, the participation rate in the Japanese data exceeds
the mixed strategy ESS prediction of 68 percent in every period. The participation rate in the
American data fluctuates around the ESS prediction, exceeding the predicted rate in about one-
half of the periods. We test the null hypothesis that the participation rate is 68 percent using a
binomial test. Under this null hypothesis, the probability of observing 48 or more participation
6 This finding echos some previous laboratory results on voluntary public goods provision with an interior Nash
equilibrium that employ more than two subjects per group. Andreoni (1993) and Chan et aI. (1998) observe
contributions that were close to but slightly below the Nash eqUilibrium in their "no tax" treatments. Sefton and
Steinberg (1996) observe contributions that are close to but above the interior Nash equilibrium.
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decisions out of 60 (80 percent) is less than five percent. The Japanese participation rate exceeds
this critical5-percent threshold in periods 5 through 7 and periods 10 through 15. For the
American sample we have 39 subjects (recall that we omit the confused subject in the USC
session; cf. footnote 5). Under the null hypothesis of a 68 percent participation rate, the
probability of observing 32 or more participation decisions out of 39 (82 percent) is less than
five percent. The American participation rate exceeds this critical value only in period 4.
We also examined the overall participation rates separately for each of the 99 Treatment
P subjects. The mean participation rate among the 60 Japanese subjects was 0.80 (12 of 15
decisions), and the median participation rate was 0.87 (13 of 15 decisions). The corresponding
mean and median participation rates for the 39 American subjects were 0.69 and 0.73. Note that
the ESS rate of 0.68 implies on average slightly more than 10 participation decisions. Only 14 of
the 60 Japanese subjects (23.3%) participated 10 times or less, while the other 46 Japanese
subjects (76.6%) participated 11 times or more. The frequency of participation rates below and
above the ESS prediction was more even among the 39 American subjects-17 (43.6%) below
and 22 (56.4%) above. Fifteen of the 60 Japanese subjects (25%) and 5 of the 39 American
subjects (12.8%) were apparently using a pure strategy, as they participated in 15 out of 15
periods. Using the 60 separate subject observations, the Japanese data reject the ESS prediction
of 0.68 at better than the 0.0001 significance level using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. This same test does not reject the ESS participation rate in the American data
(Wilcoxon p-value=0.61).
Result 6: Hypothesis 7 is supported in the American data but not the Japanese data, although the
evidence against Hypothesis 7(b) is relatively minor in the Japanese data.
Support: Panel B of Figure 4 presents the average investment pooled within countries
with one subject participating. Mean investment falls below the prediction of 11 for both
....
countries, but investments are lower in the Japanese data (Result 3). Over all 136 investments
with one participant in the Japanese sessions, 43 (32%) were 11; over all 122 investments with
one participant in the American sessions, 77 (63%) were 11. Period-by-period Wilcoxon signed
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rank tests reject the null hypothesis of 11 at the five- percent level for the Japanese data in
periods 1 through 4, 8 and 10 through 12. This same test never rejects the null in the American
data. The sample size is slightly smaller for these tests in the American data (an average of 8.1
observations per period for the American data versus an average of 9.1 for the Japanese data),
but this lower power is unlikely to be the main cause of the lack of significance in the American
data.
Panel B of Figure 5 presents the average investment by country when both subjects
participate. The American data reject the Nash prediction of 8 at the five- percent level only in
periods 9, 10 and 11 (Wilcoxon test). The Japanese data reject the Nash equilibrium using this
same test in all periods except periods 1 and 4. Nevertheless, compared to the case of one
participant (Figure 4B), the Nash equilibrium has substantial drawing power overall. We would
therefore claim that Hypothesis 7(b) is not rejected economically in both countries.
Result 7: Hypothesis 8 is supported toward the end ofthe sessions in the American data, and iiz the first
few periods in Japanese data.
Support: The increase in participation in the Japanese data for Treatment P across rounds
raises overall investment, and average investment in Treatment P and Treatment C are not
significantly different for the Japanese data at the five percent level using a Wilcoxon test after
period 4. For the American data, this same test indicates that average investment in Treatment
P is significantly lower than in Treatment C at the five- percent level in periods 9, 12, 13, 14 and
15.
3.5 Efficiency
Result 8: Hypothesis 4 is rejected in the final third of the sessions.
Support: Figure 6 presents the average efficiency - defined as the percentage of the
maximum available earnings realized by subjects-for the Japanese and American Treatment P
sessions by period. If both subjects participate and choose the Pareto optimal investment of 12,
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they each earn 9090,7 H both subjects participate and choose the Nash investment of 8, they
each earn 7345, for an efficiency of 7345/9090=81 percent. This is displayed on the figure as a
horizontal dashed line. The horizontal solid line on the figure displays the predicted efficiency
of the ESS equilibrium, 5829/9090=64 percent.
The average efficiency differences in the two countries are not significant at the five-
percent level in any individual period using a Wilcoxon test. Figure 6 suggests, however, that
efficiency in the Japanese data begins to exceed efficiency in the American data toward the end
of the sessions. This is due to the greater participation among Japanese subjects (c.f. Figure 3)..
When pooling periods into the first, middle and final thirds of the session, a Wilcoxon test
rejects the hypothesis that efficiency is equal across countries, but only in the final third of the
session (p-value<0.01).8
4. Summary and Interpretation
The overall pattern of our results can be summarized as follows. In the American data,
the Nash (for treatment C) and ESS (for treatment P) equilibria of this game are usually not
rejected (Hypotheses 5 through 8). In the Japanese data, these equilibrium predictions are
generally rejected. Behavior of Japanese and American subjects is typically significantly
different, rejecting Hypotheses 1 through 4. In Treatme~tP, relative to their American
counterparts Japanese subjects tended to participate more and invest less when only one subject
of the pair chose to participate. This presents an important puzzle: What is different between
Japanese and American subjects that could explain their differences in behavior? As discussed
in the introduction, differences in the propensity to spite one's opponent can explain these
differences across countries.
7 Asymmetric collusion could generate even higher payoffs, but such coordination is extremely difficult in this
strangers design that randomly reaSSigned pairs each period.
S We would have preferred to use a random effects model for this test that pools observations across periods, as we
do elsewhere in this paper. The efficiency observation is defined for pairs of subjects, however, and in our strangers
design the pairs were randomly reassigned each period. Therefore, random subject or random pair effect
specifications are impossible.
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To see how these differences arise, consider the initialS periods of the Treatment P
sessions. Participation rates are similar across countries for these initial periods (Figure 3B).
However, the investment by the participating subject when only one subject participates is
substantially higher in the American data than in the Japanese data for these initial periods
(Figure 4B). That is, the Japanese subjects appear much more willing to "punish" their
opponent for not participating. By investing, say, 7 instead of the best response of 11, the
participating subject reduces her payoff from 2658 to 2210, a difference of 448. This spiteful
behavior reduces the non-participating sUbject's payoff from 8278 (if his opponent invests the
best response of 11) to 4018 (if his opponent instead invests 7), a difference of 4260. In this
environment, a spiteful subject can sacrifice only a small amount to punish her opponent
severely. This is similar to rejecting a relatively lower offer in the ultimatum game.
Overall, this spiteful behavior considerably reduces the incentive to forego participation
in the Japanese data, compared to the American data. Table 7 summaries the normal form
game for the participation decision based on realized average earnings during the first 5 periods
in the two countries. Compare these payoff tables with the theoretical payoffs based on the
stage two Nash equilibrium shown in Table 1. For the American data (Table 7A), all payoffs
are reduced compared to the theoretical predictions in Table 1 (except, of course when both fail
to participate); however, the Hawk-Dove property of this payoff matrix is preserved. The
realized payoff matrix based on the early Japanese data (Table 7B) stands in stark contrast to
Tables 1 and 4A. For the Japanese table, partidpation is a dominant strategy. We believe this is a
primary explanation of the high participation (rejecting the ESS prediction of 68 percent)
observed in the Japanese data.
The final piece of the puzzle we need to fit in is the evidence that subjects responded to
the relative realized payoffs from participation and non-participation when selecting their
participation decision across rounds. In other words, Table 7B shows that the early experience
of Japanese subjects indicates that "non-participation doesn't pay." Do subjects learn and
respond to these incentives? The following probit model of the participation decision provides
15
(2)
some evidence for this learning process. In this adaptive, reinforcement-based characterization
of learning, the probability of participation depends on the ratio of expected participation
earnings (EPE) to expected non-participation earnings (ENE):
Probability(Participation) = f(EPE/ENE)
A positive relationship between this ratio and participation implies that as the relative
profitability of participation increases, the likelihood of participation increases. The next step is
to specify the process underlying subjects' expectations. Two polar cases of "backward-
looking" expectations seem to be a reasonable starting point: (1) Coumot (or myopic)
expectations and (2) Fictitious Play expectations (for other applications, see, e.g., Cheung and
Friedman, 1997; Cox and Walker, 1998).
According to Coumot, EPE are simply the realized earnings the last time the subject
participated; and ENE are simply the realized earnings the last time the subject did not
participate. In other words, according to this model subjects maintain a very short (myopic)
memory length of one observation for each (participate or not) decision. According to Fictitious
Play, subjects have a long memory, and each past realization updates the expectation with a
declining weight. For example, if a subject has participated N times up to this round, and they
participated in this round, they update EPE as follows:
(3) EPE=((N*previous EPE)+current participation earnings)/ (N+1).
In other words, as subjects accumulate evidence they simply include it to update the average
payoff obtained from participation for EPE. ENE is analogous.9
The empirical model is probit maximum likelihood, with a random subject effect. Table
8 presents the results, separately for each session and pooled within each country, as well as
pooled across all Treatment P sessions. For Fictitious Play (Panel B), the expected payoff ratio
is not significantly different from zero in all data sets, or in one case it is significantly negative,
9 For both Coumot and Fictitious Play, we need initial expectations to use when no evidence has yet accumulated.
For these initial expectations we employ the ESS expected payoffs, which are 5829 for both EPE and ENE. Therefore,
the EPEjENE ratio is 1 in round 1.
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contrary to the learning hypothesis. For the Coumot specification (Panel A), however, the ratio
is significantly positive at the five percent level in three out of the five individual sessions and
in all pooled datasets. We therefore conclude that (1) subjects' participation decisions respond
somewhat to their experience according to this adaptive characterization of learning, and (2)
subjects appear to update their expectations using the Coumot rather Fictitious Play dynamic in
this environment.
To summarize, these results show that subjects respond to their observed experience
when deciding whether or not to participate, and they adjust toward the choice that provides
greater payoff. Japanese subjects are more likely to punish opponents who fail to participate,
even though our design allows subjects to interact only once during the experiment (recall that
this is common knowledge). Surprisingly, this (non-myopic best response) behavior by
Japanese subjects increases their partidpation relative to their American counterparts which
increases efficiency! Evaluated in isolation, spite may not seem to be a desirable cultural or
personality trait; but in strategic environments such as this one, it improves efficiency.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we presented a laboratory experiment in public goods provision, in which
subjects in one treatment first announce whether they will participate in the voluntary
contribution mechanism. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game applies, of
course, to any economic decision-makers regardless of their cultural background. The
evolutionary stable strategy in this equilibrium involves participation about two-thirds of the
time. This prediction, as well as many others we test, is supported only for the data gathered
using American subjects. Japanese subjects participated more often than the ESS prediction.
This "over-participation" generated efficiency that exceeds that observed for American subjects
toward the end of the sessions.
Although the data from the Japanese sessions generally fail to support the theoretical
equilibria based on only pecuniary payoffs, they are consistent with altemative utility payoffs
17
that include nonpecuniary considerations. For example, it is straightforward to demonstrate
,
that full participation is a "fairness equilibrium" as defined by Rabin (1993), supported by the
kind of spiteful response to nonparticipation that we observe in the Japanese data. In Rabin's
psychological game, emotional responses lead people to reward those who treat them well and
to punish those who treat them unfairly. This kind of (negative) reciprocal behavior is how we
interpret the term"spite" in our context, as distinct from simple rivalistic behavior in which a
subject seeks merely to earn more than his opponent. The data are inconsistent with such
rivalistic motivations, because such motivations are more likely to lead to less participation than
the ESS prediction since nonparticipation guarantees payoffs greater than or equal to those of
the opponent. It is also unlikely that rivalistic choices would be so close to the Nash
equilibrium when both subjects participate because rivalistic subjects have a strong incentive to
reduce their public good investment.
Our results regarding the differences across subject pools are consistent with the
hypothesis that Japanese subjects have a greater propensity to spite their opponents who fail to
participate in funding the public good. This spiteful tendency of Japanese subjects has been
identified in different previous public good environments (Saijo and Nakamura, 1995), but in
the present setting it leads to more efficient outcomes than realized by American subjects. These
individualized punishments are a special feature of two-person public goods environments,
although spiteful punishments have also been observed recently in larger public goods groups
when punishments can be directed to specific individuals-and this behavior also improves
efficiency (Fehr and Gachter, 1998). In future research we plan to interact Japanese and
American subjects in the same sessions in environments such as this and the ultimatum game.
This will indicate whether the lack of a shared cultural background initially increases
disequilibrium behavior (e.g., spiteful rejections).
18
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Player 1: V2 1-v2
Participate 7345,7345 2658,8278
VI
Not Participate 8278,2658 706,706
1-Pl
Nash equilibria: (PI, P2) =(1,0), (0,1), (0.68,0.68)
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS): (PI, P2) = (0.68, 0.68)
Table 1. First Stage Participation Payoffs Based on Nash Equilibrium Investments in the
Second Stage
21
Session Name Voluntary Participation? University Country
TsukubaC. No Univ. of Tsukuba Japan
usee No Univ. of So. Calif. United States
TsukubaP Yes Univ. of Tsukuba Japan
USCpa Yes Univ. of So. Calif. United States
TokyoP Yes Tokyo Metro. Univ. Japan
Tokyo p'b Yes Tokyo Metro. Univ. Japan
Purdue P Yes Purdue University United States
Notes: Each session employed 20 subjects for 4 practice periods and 15 actual periods. Subjects
were randomly re-paired each period.
aOne subject in the USC P session misunderstood the instructions, and her choices are removed
from the data prior to the analysis.
bThe instructions wording in the Tokyo P' session differed slightly from the other 6 sessions. In
the Tokyo P' session the phrase "the person you are paired with" replaced the phrase "your
opponent" everywhere in the instructions, record sheets, questionnaires and payoff tables.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































T k PT k b P
Session
PdPusepSesslOn ur ue su u a owo
Purdue P 0.505
(0.615)
Tsukuba P 1.648* 0.934
(0.099) (0.350)
TokyoP 2.727* 1.888* 0.970
(0.006) (0.059) (0.332)
Tokyo P' 2.455* 1.720* 0.690 0.261
(0.014) (0.085) (0.490) (0.794)
Notes: In each cell, the first number is the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the
participation probability does not differ between the row session and the columnsession, using
a random effects probit model (with the subject as the random effect). The number in
parentheses is the p-value associated with the test statistic. The statistics that reject the null
hypothesis of no differences across sessions at the ten-percent level are highlighted with
asterisks.
Table 4. Participation Rate Tests Across Sessions: Pooled Across Rounds using a
Random Effects Error Specification
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T k PT k b P
Session
PdPusepSesslOn ur ue su u a o ,yo
Purdue P 1.628
(0.104)
Tsukuba P 0.405 2.961*
(0.685) (0.003)
TokyoP 2.485* 6.639* 2.199*
(0.013) (0.000) (0.028)
Tokyo P' 1.558 4.234* 1.574 0.793
(0.119) (0.000) (0.116) (0.428)
Notes: In each cell, the first number is the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean
investment with one subject participating does not differ between the row session and the
column session, using a random effects model (with the subject as the random effect). The
number in parentheses is the p-value associated with the test statistic. The statistics that reject
the null hypothesis of no differences across sessions at the ten-percent level are highlighted
with asterisks.
Table 5. Mean Investment with One Subject Participating Tests Across Sessions: Pooled
Across Rounds using a Random Effects Error Specification
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T k PT k b P
Session
PdPusepSesslOn ur ue su u a o ,yo
PurdueP 2.272*
(0.023)
Tsukuba P 1.240 1.974*
(0.215) (0.048)
TokyoP 1.330 4.611* 3.281*
(0.184) (0.000) (0.001)
TokyoP' 1.218 1.268 1.084 3.825*
(0.223) (0.205) (0.278) (0.000)
Notes: In each cell, the first number is the i-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean
investment with both subjects participating does not differ between the row session and the
column session, using a random effects model (with the subject as the random effect). The
number in parentheses is the p-value associated with the test statistic. The statistics that reject
the null hypothesis of no differences across sessions at the ten-percent level are highlighted
with asterisks.
Table 6. Mean Investment with Both Subjects Participating Tests Across Sessions:




Player 1: V2 l-V2
Participate 7167,7167 2400,7279
VI
Not Participate 7279,2400 706,706
l-PI
Table 7A. First Stage Participation Payoffs Based on Average Payoffs in the Second
Stage Through Period 5 (American Data)
Player 2:
Participate Not Participate
Player 1: V2 l-V2
Participate 6570,6570 2049,4795
VI
Not Participate 4795,2049 706,706
l-PI
Table 7B. First Stage Participation Payoffs Based on Average Payoffs in the Second
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Figure 3: Participation Rate in Treatment P, by Session and by Country
Panel A: All 5 Sessions Sepa~ately
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Figure 4: Mean Investment in Treatment P when only One Subject Participates, by Session and
by Country
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Figure 5: Mean Investment in Treatment P when Both Subjects Participate, by Session and by
Country
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